



*Adjunct Professor of International Affairs*

February 26, 2007

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** **Colonel Michael Meese**  
**Professor and Head Dept of Social Sciences**

**CC:** **Colonel Cindy Jebb**  
**Professor and Deputy Head Dept of Social Sciences**

**SUBJECT:** After Action Report—General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret)  
**VISIT AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 16-23 February 2007**

**1. PURPOSE:** This memo provides feedback on strategic and operational assessment of security operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in support of US Central Command. Be glad to provide Faculty Seminar and Cadet Class AAR on this report during this Semester or at your convenience.

**2. SOURCES:**

**A. Afghanistan:**

- 1.) **US Ambassador Ron Neumann. DCM Richard B. Norland:** Lunch/two hour discussion.
- 2.) **Gen Dan McNeill, CG NATO ISAF:** One-on-one Office Call.
- 3.) **Gen Bismullah Khan. Chief Afghan Army:** Two Sessions.
- 4.) **MG Bob Durbin USA and BG Bill Chambers USAF:** Two Sessions -- CSTC-A.
- 5.) **MG Dave Rodriguez. CG RC-EAST. (JTF-76) (CG 82<sup>nd</sup> Abn Div):** Office Call and Battle Staff Briefings.
- 6.) **MG Steve Layfield USA. NATO ISAF. DCOM Security:** Office Call.
- 7.) **DR Zalmay Rassoul, Afghan Director of National Security Council (and Staff):** Visit/Briefings
- 8.) **CG KMTC Training Center: BG Amin Wardak. BG Doug Pritt, CG Task Force Phoenix:** Visit/Briefings Kabul Military Training Center --KMTC.
- 9.) **Afghan Commanding General: Afghan National Military Command Center. BG Mike Harrison USA and Mentor Team:** Visit/Briefings.
- 10.) **US Embassy – Country Team Briefing -- DCM, Political Officer, Economic Counselor, Political-Military Affairs Officer, US AID Director and Deputy, INL Director and Deputy.**
- 11.) **Senior General Officer USSOCOM and C/S. Special Operations:** Briefing.

- 12.) **INL Director Elizabeth Richard and Mr. Gene Trammell Deputy Program Manager, Afghan Eradication Force:** Meeting/Briefings
- 13.) **Senior Intelligence Official:** One-on-one Meeting.
- 14.) **DEA Country Attaché: Mr. Vince Balboa and Assistant Attaché Mr. Kirk Meyer:** Meeting.
- 15.) **MG Durbin, BG Mike Harrison, BG Bill Chambers USAF, BG Greg Young (Canada), BG Tad Buk (Poland), Mr. Tim Muchmore SES:** General Officer-- Dinner/Discussion. CSTC-A.
- 16.) **Col Jack McCracken --Director and LTC Andrew Duff Canada—Chief of Analysis:** Border Brief. (Joint Intelligence Operations center-Afghanistan).
- 17.) **Mr. Michael Metrinko. US Embassy. Senior Advisor for Afghan Parliament:** Dinner/Discussions.
- 18.) **Mr. David Dobrotka and LTC Steven King:** Breakfast Meeting. CSTC-A **Police Reform Directorate.**
- 19.) **Col. William E. Bulen and Staff -- US Army Engineer District Afghanistan:** Briefing.
- 20.) **Col. Michael Norton. Defense Attaché:** Briefing.
- 21.) **Col. John Nicholson. 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division and Battle Staff:** Visit. FOB Salerno. Brigade Commander.
- 22.) **Col. Martin Schweitzer. 82<sup>nd</sup> Abn Division and Battle Staff:** Visit. FOB Salerno. Brigade Commander.
- 23.) **Mr. Edward M. Smith, Chief of Staff. LTC Tom Burgess:** Briefing **Afghan Reconstruction Group.** Border Initiative.

#### **B. Pakistan:**

- 1.) **DCM Peter Bodde. (Ambassador in US for Senate Confirmation.):** Office Call.
- 2.) **US Embassy – Country Team Briefings. Economic Counselor. Political Counselor. DAO.**
- 3.) **MG Ron Helmley. ODRP:** Office Call/Briefings.
- 4.) **Senior Intelligence Officials:** Separate Briefings.
- 5.) **Pakistan Army Vice Chief Gen Hassan Hyat. (Accompanied by MG Helmley.):** Office Call/Briefing.
- 6.) **Pakistan Director General ISI and Senior Staff. (Accompanied by MG Helmley and Senior US Intelligence Official.):** Office call/Briefings.
- 7.) **MG Achmed Pasha -- Pakistan Army Director Military Operations and Staff:** Office Call/Briefing.
- 8.) **Pakistan Air Vice Marshall and two Pakistan Legislators. (Accompanied by MG Helmley):** Dinner/seminar.
- 9.) **US Delegation and Senior Pakistani Officials:** Reception -- DCM Residence.
- 10.) **Commander Special Task Force:** Briefing.
- 11.) **Gave OPD on GWOT to Officers/NCOs/Civilians ODRP and DAO.**

### **3. GENERAL:**

The War in Afghanistan has been shamefully under-resourced by DOD throughout the entire intervention in terms of inter-agency involvement, US combat forces, political will, and nation-building resources.

The situation is now turning rapidly for the better:

- We have an expectation of billions of US Congressional dollars for Afghan Reconstruction (26 PRT's now operating effectively—although only the 13 US PRT's have the flexible \$161 million CERP funds available)
- There is a continued crash development of the ANA by the dedicated soldiers and Marines of Task Force Phoenix.
- We expect the arrival this year of thousands of new military and civilian personnel for ANP Police Reform and Mentoring.
- We have the beginnings of a serious drug eradication effort spurred by State Dept INL and reluctantly supported initially by DOD.
- JTF-76 now has an additional US combat brigade (the courageous soldiers of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division whose last minute extension gave us the needed immediate edge of combat power).
- The assumption of command of ISAF by US General Dan McNeil, and the transfer of full battle responsibility for the AOR to NATO is a huge boost to our capabilities.
- Finally, US Air Force, Navy, and Army Air Power have kept us afloat for the last year of bitter fighting.

We are now in a race against time. We must deal with: the Taliban (700% increase in IED's---140 suicide bombers last year); the criminals who control much of the ground level governance of the largest narco-state operation in the world; foreign fighters who now plot terrorism against both the Afghan Government and the US ---from sanctuaries in Pakistan's uncontrolled border region as well as the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan; and finally from the growing disaffection of the suffering people of Afghanistan who lack police, roads, electricity, security, jobs, and belief in their government.

We can, without question, achieve our US national objective of a functioning law-based state -- with a performing, non-drug economy--- which rejects sanctuary for terrorism. This is the cross-over year. The execution of our plan in the coming 24 months will decide the outcome in the country. 90% of the Afghan people (to include the Pashtuns) reject the extremist ideology of the Taliban. They strongly abhor the continuing violence. They are working frantically throughout the country to re-build. They admire and trust their new Army. They are incredibly eager to absorb new lessons, new opportunities. They trust, admire, and protect their Embedded US Trainers. They will support security and progress while remaining a deeply Islamic state. In addition, the Pakistanis are strongly supportive of our goal of a strong, stabilized state.

Rhetoric and political will cannot achieve our goals. Afghanistan needs strong US inter-agency and Congressional support to provide the dollars, equipment, combat soldiers, ANA and ANP mentors, and vigorous NATO and Afghan leadership to pull this mission from the fire.

### **4. THE ANP and the ANA:**

A necessary but not sufficient precondition of US success is the creation of Afghan Security Forces that can shoulder the burden of internal security. At all levels--- the Afghans reiterate that they want their own soldiers carrying the burden of blood and casualties. (ANA unauthorized absence which was 36% is now reduced to 12%) The whole ASF effort has been brilliantly managed by a succession of National Guard units -- and the leadership of the CFC-A and now CSTC-A. (MG Bob Durbin USA has done heroic work.)

We are now beginning a crash ANP effort to get the equipment, trainers, dollars, and supervision for the police: \$2+ billion consisting of --\$1 billion construction--\$700 million equipment to include 12,000 vehicles—\$440 Million training—3500 US Police mentors ...(2500 military and 1000 civilian police mentors). The effort to create the Afghan police is currently grossly under-resourced with 700 US trainers (500 US Police). In Iraq -- we have 7000 US police trainers working on the Iraqi Police. In Kosovo we had 5000 police mentors for 6500 Kosovo Police.

We have no real grasp of what actual ANP presence exists at the 355 District level operations. We have trained 60,000 Afghan police—but we have no idea where they are. We do know that 50% more Afghan police were KIA last year than ANA soldiers. Probably there are non-uniformed, untrained, and largely criminal elements in many of the District Capitals. There are no real jails-- or prosecutors --or judges -- or squad cars. The 34 Provincial level capitals actually do have a uniformed Police presence with a functioning connection to national Police command authority. The ANP presence in some key areas such as Kabul is inadequate... but functioning. There is a new National Police Command Center.

The task of creating 82,000 Afghan Policemen (currently a notional 62,000 force) is a ten year job that we must fully resource. We are now initiating a Police Reform Program which includes assessing the 15,000 officers of the ANP -- and firing half of them. Without effective police -- there cannot be governance. Without effective police -- there cannot be security and counter-insurgency. Without effective police -- there will be no economic reconstruction. The Germans had the lead on this effort. They have done an inadequate job. The German program consists of a few senior German police mentors (40+) of enormous professionalism but few resources.

The ANA is much better postured. They have pride, embedded US trainers, a functioning chain-of-command, a superb combat leader (Gen Bismullah Kahn as CHOD), and rudimentary equipment. They will fight. They are in good physical shape. (Like mountain goats). They are the first element of national unity in 100 years in Afghanistan. They have successfully mixed ethnic formations at all levels. They have been able to discount the factional pull on their unity of purpose. They actually look like great soldiers. However, they have no real national logistics or maintenance system.

The ANA has for all practical purpose no air power---neither helicopter nor fixed wing. We should in my view have a five year program to equip them with 100+ Blackhawks (some equipped as gun ships), 25+ Chinooks, and two dozen C130's/AC130's.

They have no high speed, wheeled, light armor. (They should have three battalions of Stryker combat vehicles.) They have junk small arms and should be equipped with US Army modern automatic weapons. They lack body armor. They lack deployable, modern mortars and light artillery. (This has been the absolute key to keeping US Army combat units alive along the eastern frontier.)

If we want to be out of Afghanistan in 15 years—we need to spend 10 Billion dollars on ANA and ANP equipment over the next five years ---and equip a capable, dominant battle force and law enforcement capability.

## **5. NATO:**

NATO presence in Afghanistan and their current responsibility for all of the national AOR is a political and security triumph. (37 nations and 36,000 troops---15,000 US) The brave Canadians have done well in very stiff combat in Khandahar Province. (We need to get their battalions to the NTC or JRTC for pre-deployment training). The Brit's are as usual superb and well equipped fighters. The Dutch have left the security of Kabul and are operating in Oruzgan Province. Some other Coalition elements have done excellent service—e.g. the French Special Forces Company, Portuguese Infantry Company, etc. The US should be enormously grateful that NATO legitimacy backs our national strategy.

As a general statement, however, the NATO forces are too weak on the ground, lack essential supporting elements (helicopters, engineers, logistics, intelligence), have severely restrictive rules-of-engagement, and may lack the national political will to fight when required. It is possible that the Taliban will try to knock one or more of these NATO nations out of the war. A major blow to the Italians, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Spanish, or the Germans might shatter their weak domestic political support.

The greatest value of NATO is their Command and Control presence--- the ISAF Headquarters. In my view, it is essential that the US retain the Commander position. The US will continue to provide the bulk of the useful ground combat power, air power, economic reconstruction, and trainers for the ANA and ANP. There is long NATO tradition of allowing the US to retain command where we provide essential resources.

General McNeil is tough, experienced, smart, and can command the respect of the assigned military forces. He now has 19+ NATO Generals ---with more soon to arrive (a Polish three star is expected). All of these senior officers are

extremely talented and dedicated officers. The NATO Allies should rotate the Deputy and other positions—not the commander.

SACEUR should consider eliminating their intervening level of NATO command supervision. There is little value added.

## **6. PAKISTAN:**

The Pakistanis are in a very difficult political and military situation. Their domestic reputation as an Army for professionalism and valor is all that holds together the four nations of Pakistan under one weak state. They have never controlled the FATA areas. The 80,000 troops they put into the FATA have suffered hundreds of killed and wounded. They are still there. They have never controlled Baluchistan outside of the urban areas without concentrated military force. They are a poor country with a very effective Army--- (Partially our military responsibility. We do support them with \$100 million a month. However, we need to provide the support needed to actually control their borders and the chaos of their frontier regions).

In my view, the Pakistanis are NOT actively supporting the Taliban ---nor do they have a strategic purpose to destabilize Afghanistan. There is a history of support for the Taliban among the Pakistani Army. The Taliban are in many respects neither Afghans nor Pakistanis---they are Pashtuns wearing Black turbans and baggy pants—with AK47's and with an aversion to foreigners (US or Pakistani Army). 27 million Pashtuns live on both sides of the border—60 tribes—80% in desperate poverty, 19% literacy, three million are Afghan refugees in Pakistan living right along the frontier. The Duran Line does not exist as a recognized political division in the view of the many tribes which dominate the frontier regions.

The Pakistanis need better US support for COIN operations in South and North Waziristan. We need to sort out a set of strategic tools to help them do better. They immediately require the \$395 million they have requested for their Frontier Corps. It will be a disaster for our strategic purpose if we push them to premature military action which destroys them as a unifying and stabilizing force in the region.

Pakistan is in many respects our most important ally in the global struggle against terrorism. Their economy is booming, poverty is being reduced, and the economy is trying to diversify. President Musharraf must face an election in 2007. He is the most democratic leader in Pakistan history. The control of the Army has been traditionally the only form of continued legitimate political power in Pakistan. The Army is the only load-bearing institution. The Police are corrupt. The lower courts are intimidated. (The higher court system is very capable).

The people trust and admire the Army more than any other institution. The ISI is also essentially an extension of the Army. Some of the national business elite are from the Army. The political parties have been ineffective or dangerous--- (personality not policy based, corrupt, extreme, and incompetent). Politics in Pakistan until Musharaff has been about political families and their struggle for power.

The US will miss our brilliant US Ambassador Ryan Crocker during the coming crucial 24 months. We must continue to strongly support democratic reform--- but not to forget the vital US national objectives at stake in Pakistan in the immediate future.

## **7. US COMBAT UNITS:**

The most important single factor in Afghanistan--without which nothing else is possible-- is the reality of the enormous courage, aggressiveness, discipline, and flexibility of US combat forces. No one inside the Washington Beltway actually understands the gravity of this finding. It is assumed to be what happens when you reach for the military tool. This is no accident. It is a function of NCO and Officer leadership--- and the decade long exposure to combat and stability operations of the Joint Forces team in the Balkans, Desert Storm, Iraq II, Afghanistan, and the many other theaters in which US air, sea, and land power operate.

These troops are the best combat force we have ever fielded. They are physically and mentally tough. Their OPSEC is unbelievable (one of the major historical weaknesses of the US Army). Many are now on their third or even fourth combat tour. They know their business cold. They know each other from repeated deployments in the same units.

They have solved the Joint interoperability problems with air power, artillery, and logistics at a tactical level. The commanders are incredibly experienced at company, battalion, and brigade. The generals grew up together in combat and trust each other. (The current Afghan deployed US Army force is the paratrooper--light infantry cult. They are self-actualizing).

The Joint Force fundamental combat skills are awesome. I don't think they understand how good they are. The primary reason that US casualties number in the hundreds killed and maimed -- instead of the thousands -- is the enormous tactical skill of these battle forces. They can employ all elements of combat power in a synergistic manner. The enormously responsive and massively shaky logistics system actually works that operates thru the Port of Karachi and with the dedicated support of US contractors.

US Air Force and Naval air power is the monster combat multiplier. We have employed three times the tonnage of ordnance in Afghanistan as in Iraq. Small diameter bombs and GPS guidance have revolutionized the effectiveness of Close Air Support. B1 bombers have become a strategic tool with tactical application.

C130's give us enormous operational mobility in-country. C17's bring US logistics to the end-of-the-earth in near real time. Air drop now puts heavy drop re-supply into infantry platoon positions at 5000 feet mountain locations with 50 meter accuracy ---from drop altitudes out of ground fire vulnerability. (4 ½ million lbs dropped last year).

UAV brings persistent eyes on the extended battlefield -- and instant death without warning to small elements of the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Satellite communications are central to command and control. The superb in-country medical treatment is backed up by instant, medically supported air evac to Germany for definitive care. Army aviation is central to every function of ground combat.

This is the worst flying weather and environment on the face of the earth. Air power is the key to tactical success in this operational environment.

## **8. THE SOCOM STRATEGIC CAPABILITY:**

The special operations forces (both regular and black SOF) are a strategic tool of enormous value. By themselves they cannot win the nation's wars. With them -- we can fight an entirely different campaign which is targeted, relatively lower cost, and with relatively lower casualty rate. However, we are busting up these strategic assets at a very high rate with killed, wounded, and injured.

Most importantly--these Air-ground-sea special operations forces can locate and kill or capture terrorist groups operating in a covert manner in both urban and rural terrain while minimizing impact on innocent populations. These are the most dangerous people on the face of the earth.

These SOCOM forces are very difficult to recruit, train, and optimize for a given operational area. We need to significantly expand this strategic tool. The SOCOM air power elements are incredibly costly to create and train. The development of Special Forces ground operators are similar to the time and cost of a program to develop high performance aircraft.

We need to take a revolutionary look at the methods of creating these "Tier One" forces. It will require a separately funded recruiting program similar to WWII OSS programs to identify college graduates, with superb athletic skills, who will volunteer for a 24 month training program (to include total immersion language training in Arabic or Dari) ---followed by a four year employment tour. The financial recruiting incentives of this program would have to reflect the strategic value of the effort to national security. We cannot continue to just find these kinds of operators in the general Army population. The Rangers are already running a separate program that is working reasonably well.

## **9. ROADS AND NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION:**

The central key to winning the war in Afghanistan is economic reconstruction and employment. This requires roads to each Provincial capital, roads to each District capital, cross-border economic transportation roads and rail, electrical power, clean water, a simple but workable educational system, a rudimentary health care system (preventive health and health education), and agricultural reform.

The current system has been badly organized, marked by US governmental turf battles, badly resourced, and has poor oversight. The allies provide inadequate help. (The Saudis and Japanese are an exception). The Indian and Iranian help is viewed as a strategic threat rather than an incorporated value added. We do not exploit for IO purposes the effective work that we have completed. (Total of \$1.97 billion of US Army Engineer work---\$4.50 billion total work).

Fortunately -- help is on the way. If Congress acts ---we should see \$10.6 billion in economic and military aid approved for the Afghans. (The EU has pledged \$780 million in aid for Afghanistan over the next four years.) We must lose the "Expeditionary" mindset. Reconstruction in this destroyed nation is going to take 25 years. We should consolidate all reconstruction activity (State, DOD, USAID, PRT) under a US Army Engineer Major General with an adequate staff and contractor support. This is a turf issue of enormous sensitivity—but only the Army Engineer Corps can marshal the management expertise to work in a dangerous security environment such as Afghanistan.

## **10. THE DRUG ISSUE:**

Afghanistan is now a narco-state. The opium/heroin take is \$3.1 billion -- which is 1/3 of the GNP. The British have the lead for the program and are not adequately resourced for the effort. There is no single unifying leadership for the US nor international effort. President Karzai gets no unified support from the international community—many urge him to ignore the drug eradication program.

Ambassador Ann Patterson at State Department is trying valiantly to organize our governmental effort with grudging support from other departments. We have a superb INL Director on the ground in Afghanistan. (Ms Elizabeth Richard). There is a very small but capable DEA presence (7 Agents with intermittent support from six month deployed FAST teams.) There is a battalion-sized Afghan Eradication Force which operates with rudimentary equipment and funding—under frequent fire and with continuing casualties.

In my view, we must support the counter-drug effort as a key to achieving stable government in Afghanistan. This should be a 10,000 man ANP program ---supported by a \$250 million INL program---with an in-country presence of 200+ DEA agents with primary training and operational responsibility for all law enforcement operations.

If we do not get a serious and sustained effort on counter-drug operations—in my view we will fail to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan.

## **11. SUMMARY:**

The Afghan economy is booming at 12% growth rate a year. \$14 billion has been spent on aid since 2001. Six TV channels and a hundred free/uncensored publications are available to the people. Literacy is increasing rapidly. The ring road is now 2/3 complete. The 40,000 soldiers of the ANA are growing rapidly in numbers and capability. There are 45,000 NATO and US troops in-country. There is a functioning democracy with an elected Parliament ---and a serious, dedicated Afghan President in office.

Afghanistan can be a strategic victory in the struggle against terrorism. We are now on the right path.

Barry R. McCaffrey  
General USA (Ret)  
Adjunct Professor of International Affairs  
USMA, West Point, NY.