



Adjunct Professor of International Affairs

August 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Subject: **After Action Report** -- Trip To Afghanistan and Pakistan
Friday 11 August through Friday 19 August 2005

1. PURPOSE:

This memo provides initial feedback reference visit by General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) to Pakistan and Afghanistan on Friday, 11 August through Friday, 19 August 2005.

2. SOURCES:

- a. **Briefing** - State Department. **Ambassador Nancy Powell** and **Acting INL Director Bill Parr**. 3 August 2005.
- b. **Briefing** - **JCS J5**. Afghanistan Division. 4 August 2005.
- c. **Briefing** - **Secretary Martin Hoffman**. DOD. Afghan Reconstruction Effort. 4 August 2005.
- d. **Country Team Seminar** - US EMBASSY PAKISTAN. **Chargè DCM Patricia Butenis, POL Officer, Econ Officer, DAO, RAO, ODRP, USAID**. 14 August 2005.
- e. **Briefing** - US Embassy Pakistan. **DEA and NAS**. Counter-drug strategy. 14 August 2005.
- f. **Briefing** - US EMBASSY PAKISTAN. ODRP and DAO. 14 August 2005.
- g. **Briefing** - Pakistan Army General Headquarters. **Director General Military Intelligence**. 15 August 2005.
- h. **Briefing** - Pakistan Army General Headquarters. **Director General Military Operations**. 15 August 2005.
- i. **Seminar** - US EMBASSY PAKISTAN. US Country Team. 15 August 2005.
- j. **Meeting** - Legal Attaché FBI. US EMBASSY PAKISTAN. 15 August 2005.
- k. **Briefing** - US EMBASSY PAKISTAN. Anti-Terrorism Attaché. 15 August 2005.
- o. **Dinner/Briefings** - Afghanistan. **CFC-A Vice-Commander (UK), Chief-of-Staff, and J3**. 15 August 2005.
- p. **Breakfast/Seminar** - US Ambassador Ron Neumann, DCM, Political Officer, CFC-A Commander LTG Karl Eikenberry. 16 August 2005.
- q. **Briefing** - LTG Karl Eikenberry CFC-A Command in Afghanistan. 16 August 2005.
- r. **Briefing** - CFC-A Inter-agency Counter-Narcotics. 16 August 2005.
- s. **Lunch/Briefings** - **BG (Ret) Herb Lloyd**. DYNCORP. Drug Eradication and Police Mentor Programs. 16 August 2005.

- t. **Meeting - Afghan Minister of Defense. Minister Wardak.** 16 August 2005.
- u. **Meeting - Afghan National Security Advisor. Dr. Rassoul.** 16 August 2005.
- v. **Meeting/Discussions - United Nations Representative Afghanistan. Dr. Jean Arnault.** 16 August 2005.
- w. **Ground Recon - Kabul.** (Economic and social reconstruction). 16 August 2005.
- x. **Command and Staff Briefing - JTF-76 Afghanistan. MG Jason Kamiya.** 16 August 2005.
- y. **Border Visit.** Border Control Point #6. Briefing. ANA Battalion (minus). 17 August 2005.
 - **Briefing - Special Forces B Team Cdr and Team NCO.**
 - **Briefing - Battalion Commander, Company Commander 82nd Abn Division.**
 - **Briefing - USMC Major. Embedded Trainer. ANA.**
- aa. **Briefing - Area of operations. Brigade Headquarters 82nd Abn Div.** Salerno LZ. 17 August 2005.
- bb. **Lunch/Sensing Session - Company Grade Officers/NCOs.** 82nd Abn Bde Headquarters. Salerno LZ. 17 August 2005.
- cc. **Briefing - Command Operations and Intelligence. Headquarters CJ Special Operations Task Force.** Bagram. 17 August 2005.
- dd. **Commander's Update Briefing - JTF-76.** Bagram. 17 August 2005.
- ee. **Dinner/Seminar - JTF-76 Full Colonel and LTC Commanders.** Bagram. 17 August 2005.
- ff. **Breakfast/Sensing Session - JTF-76.** Bagram. NCOs. 18 August 2005.
- gg. **Briefing - KBR effort Afghanistan.** 18 August 2005.
- hh. **Briefings - Khandahar. TF Bayonet. Operations and Intelligence. 173rd Abn Bde.** 18 August 2005.
- ii. **Briefings - Qalat. FOB31 Special Forces. Operations and Intelligence.** 18 August 2005.
- jj. **Briefings - Qalat. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Khandahar.** 18 August 2005.
- kk. **Sensing Session/Lunch - Qalat. Company Commanders and 1st Sergeants.** 173rd Abn Infantry battalion. 18 August 2005.
- ll. **Briefings - Task Force Rock. Airborne Infantry Battalion. 173rd Abn Bde. Qalat.** 18 August 2005.
- mm. **Briefing - Army Aviation Task Force. Khandahar.** 18 August 2005.

3. THE BOTTOM LINE:

1st - AFGHANISTAN--- MOVING INTO THE LIGHT:

The situation since my last visit in July 2004 has changed significantly for the better. Afghanistan has evolved from a condition of medieval chaos to the beginnings of an organized state characterized by: an operational government; an existing police force; an equipped, partially trained, and operational 35 battalion Army; a set of international partners to include NATO and the UN; a generally positive relationship with its neighbors Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian Republics; an economy that is exploding with individual enterprise from one end of the country to the other as individual families and tribes claw their way out of abject misery; and the beginnings of individual liberty and the protection of law for citizens—in particular women, refugees, minorities, and non-Muslims.

2nd - AFGHANISTAN - THE SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS MARK THE TOP OF THE CURVE:

Afghanistan is poised to have hugely successful elections on 18 September 2005 that will bring 500+ elected officials from 6000+ candidates into Provincial Councils and the national legislature. There is almost no possibility that these elections can be invalidated by even the spectacular Taliban terrorist acts which are pending. Violence from resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda activity will continue and peak in the time-frame October through December 2005 as the winners are announced and seated in the new legislative bodies. Next spring-summer will be another surge cross-border push of the Taliban - with a probable significant but unsuccessful offensive against an Afghan government that will by then have growing momentum and legitimacy.

3rd – U.S. COMBAT FORCES - HEROIC ENDEAVORS:

U.S. Military Forces continue to play a vital role in every aspect of the political, economic, security, and social reconstruction of the Afghan State. The competence, enormous creativity, and courage of these troops are simply awe-inspiring. Some are on their FOURTH combat tour. Most are on their second or third combat tour. Their dedication and personal bravery continue unabated despite significant danger and incredibly tough operating conditions. 90% of the Afghan people are in general grateful and supportive of their presence and recognize their essential role in creating a new future for the nation. These U.S. combat forces - Army, Marine, and Special Operations have killed 700+ Taliban and foreign fighters since the election. There is considerable intense, ongoing combat at small unit level. U.S. Forces operate in squad sized elements which may be in some cases TEN HOURS DRIVE from their supporting unit. These U.S. combat units are some of the toughest troops I have ever encountered. The Special Operations units are really extraordinary. 155mm artillery, 105mm artillery (positioned by helicopter), and 120mm mortars as well as USAF AC130's have made a huge difference in our capabilities to operate with lesser casualties in this dangerous environment.

4th - THE U.S SENIOR LEADERSHIP TEAM:

The U.S. leadership team is superb. The new U.S. Ambassador Ron Neumann, who just came out of Iraq - is experienced, extremely talented, and widely admired by the U.S. Armed Forces. He will bring a very different relationship to the Karzai Government that is appropriate for the times. The CFC-A Commander LTG Karl Eikenberry is: on his second Afghan Tour; a serious combat leader; a brilliant political-military expert; and someone with enormous personal courage. The Commander of JTF-76, MG Jason Kamiya is top 1% talent; an enormously skilled former JRTC tactical leader; and has terrific mature judgment.

5th - THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE - A SHAKY REED:

The Afghan National Police are a disaster. We have an inadequate U.S. strategy to by-pass the lead nation, Germany - and provide a large muscle movement solution that will allow us to largely withdraw from Afghanistan in five years. Local police officers with adequate training and equipment in rural and urban neighborhoods - who have the trust of the tribes and ethnic factions - are the central key to good intelligence and effective counter-insurgency. We are now starting an emergency fix. However, we need more resources and even greater contractor and active U.S. military engagement. The Afghan police need U.S. firearms (Berettas, M16's, M203's, and M60's), they need up-armored Humvees (1500+), they need ASVs (250+), they need police stations in every district, they need jails in every district, and they need an effective nation-wide comms system. They still need uniforms. Fortunately, they are about to get

imbedded police mentors from a U.S. contractor. At their best, the Afghan police are badly equipped and marginally effective.

6th – AFGHANISTAN - A GIANT NARCO-STATE:

Afghanistan has become a giant narco-state. This situation - if not comprehensively confronted in the coming 24 months - will destroy any possibility of building a successful, modern state. Afghanistan now produces 87% of the world's opium. It turns out 582 metric tons of heroin. There is no effective counter to the growing corruption and addiction produced by this criminal activity which is prohibited by international law and Afghan law. Opium production is new to Afghanistan since the 1984 period. As an example of the extent of the problem, one of the provincial governors was recently discovered with 17 metric tons of pure heroin in the basement of his palace. He asserted that he was holding it for authorities. The Brits lead a tiny interdiction force. A very small DEA team of 17 people has produced the beginnings of what will eventually be a counter-drug police force. A very small U.S. contractor manual eradication effort has negotiated with local Afghan leaders to eliminate some poppy fields. U.S. Military Forces conduct operations in the midst of opium poppy fields which reach 20 miles by 60 miles size. Resurgent poppy production is now appearing in Pakistan with its 3 million opiate addicts. Without question, there is a huge flow of illegal cash into the warlords, the Taliban, and al Qaeda. These illicit funds will buy weapons, jobs, bribes, control of the emergent press, corruption among international organizations and NGOs, and corruption in local and national government. It will also increase drug addiction among the general population (in particular refugees, women, and orphans), the Afghan security forces, and eventually the U.S. Armed Forces and NATO Forces in-country.

7th - THE PAKISTANIS - TROUBLED PARTNERS:

The Pakistanis are fully cooperating with the U.S. on a strategic level to confront and eliminate al Qaeda - and to minimize the presence of foreign jihadists in the extensive Madrassa fundamentalist schooling system. They have 75,000 troops now courageously operating in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas who are making a significant impact limiting the operational capability of Taliban sanctuaries. (Our funds of \$75 million a month pay for a huge part of the Pakistani military operating budget - beyond that of the forces directly involved in this Border effort). However, there is strong reason to believe that the Pakistan continues to be ambivalent about terrorist training camps that support Kashmiri insurgents - which may, in many cases, include terrorists who will in fact end up in Afghanistan. There is considerable evidence that at the actual border Pakistani forces either ignore or collude with Taliban and foreign fighters operating from Northwest Territory sanctuaries. There is a surprising level of official and societal animosity between Pakistan and Afghanistan on both sides of the border. The Army is the only load-bearing institution. The dramatic resurgence of the Pakistani economy is not matched by any significant political integration of the disparate factions within the country. Relations with India although greatly improved in the last 24 months--are still an obsession of the Pakistanis and dominate their strategic view. President Musharraf continues to display extraordinary political skill and personal courage in guiding Pakistan through these perilous times. Our economic support has been instrumental to keeping the support of Pakistani elites. However, we have not adequately supported our allies in Pakistan.

8th - THE INTER-INTERAGENCY TEAM - MISSING IN ACTION:

We have a serious U.S. national problem. The U.S. country team and the inter-agency process which is so vital to successful operation of the PRTs, as well as to the support of the emerging Ministries of the Afghan government-- are not adequately supported by their stateside U.S. Departments. In many cases, required positions are not filled because employees will not "bid" on the open positions, are gapped, are filled with short-term TDY personnel, or are filled with inexperienced or poorly qualified representatives. It seems unlikely that we can break out of this situation. In many cases we will be forced to rely on U.S. Army or Marine company and battalion commanders on the ground to implement US political and economic policy. This, of course, creates anxiety on the part of State, Agriculture, Treasury, USAID or other U.S. Agencies who are formally charged with these functions. In the longer term, we should accept that U.S. Contractors must be the preferred solution. Contractors can and will produce competent, courageous people who will serve in extremely dangerous and arduous conditions---and who will stay for successive contract periods of years in duration. The KBR Rep in Afghanistan is a retired Marine LTC with nine years foreign service and enormous dedication to our forces. The DYNCORP Rep is a retired Army BG, who has stayed overseas in the hellholes of the world for the past 11 years. Both have a strong sense of business integrity and see themselves

as continuing to serve the American people. We need to embrace contractors as a solution instead of leaving the vitally important PRTs and other inter-agency mechanisms in such inadequately supported conditions.

9th - THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY - COMING INTO BATTLE:

The Afghan National Army is an important, relative success story. By the end of next summer it is likely that there will be 70+ ANA battalions in the field. The U.S. Army and Marine embedded training teams with these units represent a major investment in valuable military leadership which is paying off in a significant way. Some of the ANA small unit leaders are simply magnificent, battle experienced warriors. However, we are penny-wise and pound foolish on the equipment for these forces. They are badly armed with 2nd rate Soviet junk. They have minimal wheeled vehicles with no armor kits. Their infrastructure support is clearly inadequate. If we want them to stay on the frontier- they must survive the coming winter when it may again get down to 30 degrees below zero - they must have barracks and heating systems and adequate winter clothing. They also need some armor - we must give them a major combat advantage over their adversaries in key combat capabilities. There should be several battalions equipped with M113A3s or Strykers to act as regional strike forces and to patrol the emerging road network (e.g. the paved road from Kabul to Khandahar). However, the single biggest shortcoming is the lack of an Afghan Ministry of Defense maintenance and logistics system. It is not believable that the Afghans can produce a competent, non-corrupt system in less than 5+ years. These ANA units now survive only because their imbedded U.S. trainers and their partner U.S. battalions ensure their support. In my view, we must use U.S. contractors with Afghan employees as the basis for the entire logistics network or we risk the rapid loss of ANA capability through incompetence and corruption.

10th – U.S. PUBLIC OPINION—THE MEDIA AND THE FORGOTTEN WAR:

Media coverage of the U.S. effort in Afghanistan is minimal and does not report the serious evolution of the issues. It is expensive and dangerous for the media to get to Afghanistan and then operate outside of an embedded relationship with a dedicated U.S. combat unit. Movement and circulation throughout the country are extremely dangerous. The living conditions are rudimentary. Afghanistan has become the forgotten war. Even more alarming is that is we risk having the effort viewed as a small version of Iraq-- with the same strategic relevance-- and suitable for the same policy options. The American people need an enhanced view and insights into the ongoing success of our Afghanistan operations. Suggest it is important that we aggressively allow commanders at all levels to directly interact with US media - and equally important that we facilitate and support the movement and access of the media to the key stories in the field.

11th - BELIEVING IN NATO - AN UNCERTAIN FORCE:

The NATO ISAF force is beginning transition to total control of the countrywide Coalition security forces by next summer. A very competent Brit three star will be the initial commander. An extremely professional Canadian brigade is now in-country doing recon for their January 2006 assumption of battle responsibilities in the South. Afghan Senior Leadership essentially told me they view this as a high risk situation for Afghanistan. They are unsure of ISAF combat capabilities and political will to take casualties when fighting is required. I share their apprehension even though this transfer of responsibilities is entirely the right thing to do from a political-military perspective. These NATO Forces are in most cases going to be thin gruel compared to the US airborne and Marine battalions they will replace. In addition, they will not come with the enormously sophisticated CS and CSS units which form the US Joint team (helicopters, electronic warfare, civil affairs, psyops, EOD, engineer, etc) Suggest that during the first two years of ISAF responsibilities, we have an enormous responsibility to guarantee the success of the outcome. A premature or overly aggressive drawdown could imperil all that we have accomplished.

12th - THE AGENCY - A COURAGEOUS PARTNER:

The CIA does a splendid, professional job in both countries. They are operationally bold, personally courageous, can bypass the suffocating bureaucracy and execute new programs with flexibility and resolve, have great senior leadership, and work well with the US Armed Forces. They also have great credibility and trust by their host nation counterparts.

4. SUMMARY:

- a. In the coming five years, wisdom and resolve by U.S. national leadership can achieve a splendid purpose in Afghanistan to gestate and launch a stable, reasonably effective state - that operates mostly on the basis of law. This state could be capable of fully controlling its own internal security and resisting the re-emergence of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for international terrorism. Afghanistan could also serve as a model of the possibilities of a new political state for a region characterized by incompetence, corruption, and state violence directed against their own people.
- b. U.S. policy in Afghanistan must be totally de-linked from the radically different geo-political realities that we face in Iraq.
- c. We must provide unwavering leadership support and muscle to ISAF for the first 24 months of the transition. We risk a Srebrenica if we precipitously withdraw our full array of force capabilities.
- d. We must present a genuine counter-drug strategy to the Karzai Administration and resource it adequately. There are three legs to such a drug strategy:

1st - Genuine alternative economic development.

2nd - An Afghan national conversation...a commitment from the nation to eliminate drug production and abuse based on publicly proclaimed self-interest.

3rd - The guarantee of effective manual or aerial eradication of any attempt to grow the opium poppy crop.

Without all three legs of the strategy---the effort is doomed to failure.

- e. We spend probably just under one billion dollars a month to keep the US-NATO ISAF Force in Afghanistan. If we want to eventually draw down and see the new state su